EXHIBIT 1

1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT			
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION			
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4	CHARLENE CARTER,			
5	Plaintiff,			
6	VS.			
7	CASE NO. 3:17-cv-2278-X			
8	SOUTHWEST AIRLINES CO., AND TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF			
9	AMERICA, LOCAL 556,			
10	Defendants.			
11	***************			
12	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION TO COMPEL			
13	HEARD BEFORE THE HONORABLE REBECCA RUTHERFORD UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE			
14	DECEMBER 11, 2020			
15	VIDEOCONFERENCE			
16	****************			
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PROCEEDINGS 1 2 (Call to order of the court.) 3 THE COURT: This Carter versus Transport Workers Union 4 of America Local 556, et al., and this is -- our case number is 3:17-cv-2278-X. 5 6 May I have appearances for the Plaintiff, 7 please. 8 MR. GILLIAM: Matthew B. Gilliam for the Plaintiff. 9 And, Your Honor, we also have the Plaintiff herself on the call 10 today, Plaintiff Charlene Carter. 11 THE COURT: Very well. Appearing perhaps as -- oh, there you are. "Zoom user" is your name? 12 13 MR. GILLIAM: That is she. 14 THE COURT: Thank you. We'll make sure that the record 15 reflects that you attended as well. 16 And for the Defense? 17 MR. CORRELL: Michael Correll for Defendant, Southwest 18 Airlines, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: Thank you. 20 And is there anyone else who tops put their 21 appearance on the record? 22 MR. JENNINGS: Your Honor, this is Jeffrey Jennings for Plaintiff Charlene Carter. 23 24 THE COURT: All right. Very well. Thank you. 25 So I have the motion to compel that we are

taking in consideration on an expedited basis given the timeline for discovery completion. I see on the docket that there is also a motion to extend the deadline to complete discovery, but that is not before me. Judge Starr will take that up himself.

And as I've noted in the order setting this hearing, the parties do appear to have had quite a bit of discussions so I did not require additional meet and confers.

And I think for the purposes of our hearing today, it would make sense to use the Plaintiff's reply as an agenda. Is that all right with the attorneys?

MR. GILLIAM: Yes, Your Honor.

MR. CORRELL: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Then let's take a look at Request for Production 6 and 7 and Interrogatory Number 3.

Mr. Gilliam, did you want to say anything with respect to the -- it looks like we're mostly arguing over the comparator and how the comparator should be defined. Is that how you would characterize the dispute?

MR. GILLIAM: Yeah. That's the primary dispute, Your Honor. Southwest argues that the comparators or that that -- that we seek information from flight attendants that aren't similarly situated, and our argument is that we -- we are seeking information regarding flight attendants that are similarly situated because they held the same job and

responsibilities and the -- their employment status was determined by the same person, especially -- or same persons under the social media policies.

And we -- I guess the other point that we would make is that we're not at the merit stage of the case, and we're -- we shouldn't -- we should have an opportunity to seek all of the relevant facts to put them before the Court and to make our case within reason.

The other, I think, point to be made is that under the Fifth Circuit's decision in *Brown* from just this past August, the court -- well, evidence of disparate treatment of less similarly-situated employees is still valid evidence of pretext even if it's less probative, and we -- we think that that is a key point, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Correll, do you want to respond?

MR. CORRELL: Yes, Your Honor.

First of all, I would note the RFPs you just mentioned and the interrogatory you just mentioned don't include one policy. They include three different policies, so social media, bullying and hazing, and every sexual harassment issue that has come up at Southwest Airlines.

Second of all, the standard here is extremely rigorous when articulated by the Fifth Circuit. *Brown* is consistent with that. In *Brown*, the court was addressing two different people involved in the same incident and reviewed by

the same person. So the difference between them that made them not similarly situated was that they didn't have the same awareness of the policy that they violated. That was the only distinction.

And the other court cases that -- that the Plaintiff cites are similarly distinguishable. There was an individual -- there are other individuals who had done the exact same thing, rescinded their resignation. Or in Shackelford, the court actually rejected the similarly situated -- the nonsimilarly-situated individuals simply because they took lunch at a different time of day.

The practical reality here is there is no way for us to go through, short of a seven million document linear review, to find every single time one of these 13 people have in any way touched one of these policies. They've been deposed. A corporate representative has been deposed on these issues. There was no objection to the completeness of the corporate representative's testimony or preparedness. And Plaintiff still cannot identify who they want.

The way we get comparator information is we identify people and give the information to those -- on those people. Every name we've gotten, we've produced the information. There's no good way to identify this information, and it's not relevant.

I mean, the best example would be is in

deposition it came out that there was a social media violation that involved two flight attendants at a concert holding up a sign saying Southwest flight attendants wants to get you drunk on a plane, consistent with a country strong. Well, that would be responsive, according to Plaintiff, and probative of whether or not there was discrimination against Charlene Carter. That's just not true. And it's going to impose such an extraordinary burden that there's just no way to do it, especially given that there's no indication there's anything else out there as evidenced by the testimony of the people themselves.

THE COURT: So that sounds a little bit different than just objecting that the comparator is not adequately defined.

MR. CORRELL: Well, because there's no definition -- if Mr. Gilliam would present me with the names of the specific flight attendants who he believes that are similarly situated, we can argue about whether they are specifically similarly situated. But what Southwest is being asked to do is assume every flight attendant who violated any one of these policies or even a complaint about one of these policies is similarly situated and search for all of those documents.

MR. GILLIAM: Well, Your Honor, I would say that what came out in the deposition is that the -- well, one, is that Southwest's representative had difficulty identifying anyone who -- well, other flight attendants who were subject to social

media policy discipline. And, unfortunately, Southwest has not been able to demonstrate any -- any of the burdens they're asserting. You know, the reviewing seven million e-mails is a conclusory assertion, and they haven't really been able to demonstrate why or -- why they would have to go through seven million e-mails.

The other problem is, as with Interrogatory 3, we can't identify the specific flight attendants who were reported or disciplined under these social media policies because we've not received discovery on them. We're -- that's why we're seeking this motion in the first place, is so that we do have knowledge of the -- the other flight attendants, full knowledge of the other flight attendants who were disciplined under the social media policies.

And think that the -- that in the deposition, Southwest corporate representative said that for the social media policies themselves -- or social media policy itself, there were roughly 300 -- maybe 340 flight attendants who were reported for social media violations in the last seven years, and the number is substantially less for those who were reported for bullying and hazing policies. I think that number was roughly 44 reports and 143 reports under the sexual harassment policies, and that's within the last seven years.

MR. CORRELL: So what Defendant -- Plaintiff wants is for us to search for 600 individuals across seven million

documents.

And, Your Honor, I apologize for this. I thought my representations to counsel during confer would be sufficient, but I'll state on the record as an officer of the court that we collected seven million documents; that the upload cost to be able to search them would be \$100,000; that that cost would recur every month because we're talking multiple terabytes of data, and that doesn't include the employee review costs. And so that's where the burden comes here, and it's been discussed with Plaintiff's counsel multiple times.

So -- and, by the way, there was no objection to the corporate representative's testimony. Had they felt the corporate representative's testimony was inadequate, they are permitted to object and request that we suspend the deposition and get additional information. They never once complained.

Mr. Simms was there. He was prepared through a dozen different witnesses, and we were fully equipped to answer any questions he wanted. But they're not allowed to, in the words of the Fifth Circuit, rummage through our files looking for comparators.

He's asked the people who were involved, which has been already overly inclusive group 'cause it's supposed to be limited to decisionmakers, absent actual proof of cat's paw. He's already asked all of those people those questions, so

there has been discovery on it. And they can't identify anyone who engaged in something remotely close.

And let's not forget, it's not just a violation of the policy. You don't get to compare holding up a sign at a concert to sending abortion videos and pictures of female genitalia. It's not the same. That's where the -- exactly the same issue comes in, and that's why the Fifth Circuit has such a rigorous standard for requiring this discovery.

MR. GILLIAM: The rigorous standard comes in on the merits, Your Honor. And we filed -- or we served these discovery request on Southwest in April of 2019, negotiated with them extensively to try to narrow all of our disputes. And, frankly, we've requested the information prior to the deposition in hopes of being able to have the -- the discovery to use during the deposition, which we didn't.

You know, it's very difficult to refresh a witness's recollection when you don't have any of the documents so that you can discuss specific flight attendants' cases.

MR. CORRELL: And Plaintiff's counsel was informed in May of 2020 during our first conferral on the issue of similarly-situated status that we would not change this position and he should move if he felt it appropriate. We waited until after taking the depositions to pursue that avenue.

MR. GILLIAM: And, Your Honor, I would just say we have

submitted those main e-mails in the record, and they do not reflect that Southwest would change its position. They said that they -- that we should negotiate for search terms and custodians immediately, and in good faith we undertook to do that.

MR. CORRELL: And I represented to counsel in phone calls that on the issue of similarly-situated status, we did not agree, we would not agree, and we cited the same Fifth Circuit authority provided to the Court.

THE COURT: So I think I've heard enough on this issue now.

So, Mr. Gilliam, I have read *Brown* and I do not agree that it stands for the proposition that you assert. I do not think it authorizes broad discovery to discover evidence of less similarly-situated employees as comparators. The Fifth Circuit authority that I am familiar in the employment context is that the Fifth Circuit is strict with respect to its definition of what is a similarly-situated employee.

Even in *Brown*, the paragraph that you took your quote from begins with the language that -- it states:

Typically, a plaintiff who proffers treatment of fellow employees to show pretext in a Title 7 retaliation action must show that the termination was taken under nearly identical circumstances as those faced by the comparator. And that nearly identical and the similarly situated are -- come up

again and again in the Fifth Circuit, and they're very strict. So I don't find that your discovery requests are appropriately narrowed.

I will accept counsel's representation that it would require the review of seven million documents at the cost of \$100,000 and that is not proportionate in this circumstance unless Plaintiff is willing to share the cost of that review, which we could discuss if you wanted to.

MR. GILLIAM: Your Honor, I guess we could consider it.

MR. CORRELL: And, Your Honor, to clarify, that's just
the cost of uploading the data, that does not include attorney
review.

THE COURT: So it may not be something that you can address right now, Mr. Gilliam. You may have to visit with your client about that. But as it stands, I will not order that production. If you want to visit with your client about cost shifting, then you can approach defense counsel about that; and if you can't resolve it, you can come back to me. But without some agreement by the Plaintiff to bear at least half of those costs, I won't order it.

MR. GILLIAM: Okay. Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. So then the next -- if we're going with the reply, the next category would be Request for Production Number 17. And this is relating to employees who signed grievance settlement agreements?

MR. GILLIAM: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And just to make sure I'm clear on the facts, Plaintiff did or did not sign a settlement agreement -- grievance settlement agreement?

MR. GILLIAM: The Plaintiff did not. She -- she rejected the -- signing one of the grievance settlement agreements. But Southwest has -- one of its arguments and defense against reinstatement is that Ms. Carter refused to sign one. And Ms. Carter refused to sign one because she believed that it would subject her to immediate termination without -- and would require her to waive her rights.

We also seek the -- the information because we argue that the recall supporters who signed such agreement were -- were subject to -- or could be subject to disparate treatment and that the union, I guess, union supporters who were repeat offenders had -- were treated more favorably under those agreements.

THE COURT: Mr. Correll, do you want to respond?

MR. CORRELL: Sure, Your Honor. First of all, I'm not aware of us relying on the rejection of the LCA as a defense.

That may have been articulated at some point by one of my predecessors. I don't even think that's permissible. This is Rule 408, offers to compromise that can't be used to show liability, the amount of the dispute, impeachment, bias, any of those things. So I don't know that either party has the

ability to use Ms. Carter's acceptance, rejection, or offer of a settlement agreement in any way in this case.

Further, I think expanding that to encompass other people's settlements not only falls afoul of the similarly-situated discussion that we just had, but it also runs into the same Rule 408 barrier. I don't know what we're going to be able to do with last chance agreements if we get to trial on it. I mean, this is not -- this is -- it's not probative of anything in any way that it's allowed to be used.

THE COURT: Do you have anything further, Mr. Gilliam?

MR. GILLIAM: Yes, Your Honor. Just that we -- I guess
I don't -- I don't see where Rule 408 problem comes in. We -we do think that it's relevant to showing disparate treatment.

THE COURT: All right. I think it is too attenuated to any disparate treatment given that Plaintiff did not sign a last chance or grievance settlement agreement, so that request is denied.

All right. Now, moving on to Number 3. The header is "Southwest must produce responsive information in its possession."

MR. GILLIAM: Yes.

THE COURT: What is the nature of the dispute here?

MR. GILLIAM: Here, this is just a reply to Southwest various arguments against, I guess, regarding proportionality and also against the -- the other issues that were raised.

1 THE COURT: Is it directed to any particular discovery 2 request? 3 MR. GILLIAM: This one is not, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Okay. Then let's move on to Request for Production Number 19. 5 MR. GILLIAM: Okay. And --6 7 THE COURT: How are you defining Ms. Carter's protected 8 class? 9 MR. GILLIAM: Evangelical Christians would be her 10 protected class. 11 THE COURT: All right. So what is it that you contend 12 Southwest has not produced? 13 MR. GILLIAM: We're seeking documents and communications that Southwest has about other flight 14 15 attendants' religious accommodation requests to, again, show 16 disparate treatment that others outside of Ms. Carter's 17 protected class were treated more favorably than she was. 18 Southwest did not entertain any sort of 19 accommodation request for her. And to the extent that they did 20 for other individuals outside of Ms. Carter's protected class, 21 we believe that the Southwest documents and communications 22 about those were -- accommodation request would -- are relevant 23 to our claims. 24 THE COURT: And did -- again, on the facts. Did she 25 request a religious accommodation?

MR. GILLIAM: No, Your Honor, she did not. But it's -we -- under the Supreme Court's decision in *EEOC v. Abercrombie*& *Fitch*, while the request for an accommodation might be
relevant, it's not a necessary condition of liability. And so
it's -- it's really not something that we have to show on the
merits.

THE COURT: Mr. Correll.

MR. CORRELL: Your Honor, on the reasonable accommodation claim, there's only three elements in play here. Did Ms. Carter request an accommodation with the *Abercrombie* exception, if it applies, and did Southwest provide one; and if so, did it meet the standards of the statute.

It's undisputed that Ms. Carter didn't request; it's undisputed that Southwest didn't give one. So the only fact that should be determined -- or the only legal issue to be determined is whether or not Ms. Carter was entitled to an accommodation. Nothing about other people's accommodations has any bearing on that question.

Further, even if it did, we run into the same similarly-situated status problem where we already have testimony from the corporate representative informed by interviews with the ACT team that Southwest has never been asked to provide accommodation with respect to the social media policy, the bullying policy, or the sexual harassment policy in the religious accommodation context. They've also never been

asked to or provided an accommodation retroactively, whereas here the person violated the policy and then revealed that they claimed it was based on religious belief. So there's not going to be anything in there similarly situated even if it was relevant, which it is not.

THE COURT: Mr. Gilliam?

MR. GILLIAM: No, Your Honor. I don't have anything.

THE COURT: Okay. So for similar reasons that the

THE COURT: Okay. So for similar reasons that the earlier requests were denied, this one is also denied. It is -- given that Ms. Carter did not request a reasonable accommodation, its relevance is outweighed by the burden.

Also, I think that we made the argument -- the argument may conflate the religious accommodation and the disparate treatment issues which are, I think, are separate and do not -- should not be conflated.

Moving on, then, to the next bullet point or header with regard to the Railway Labor Act. I think we've addressed the burden issue.

I don't know that we directly talked about

RFPs 18, 19, or 21. Do we need to address those specifically?

MR. GILLIAM: RFP 19 is the religious accommodation --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. GILLIAM: -- claim, so we've addressed that.

RFP 21, Southwest represents that -- I mean, the way that I -- I took Southwest to represent in their brief,

that the custodians have produced all of their responsive documents on that subject matter. If that is correct, then I guess we have nothing further on that point.

RFP 18 seeks Southwest documents regarding other flight attendants' complaints of religious discrimination.

THE COURT: So are you seeking to compel -- are you asking me today to compel something with respect to Request for Production Number 18?

MR. GILLIAM: And I don't -- I don't fully know
Southwest's position at this stage as to whether they produced
all of the responsive documents on that. I'm not sure that
that was specifically addressed in Southwest's response.

THE COURT: Mr. Correll, do you want to --

MR. CORRELL: RFP 18, just like the other RFPs we've talked about, asks for all complaints regarding religious beliefs, use, or practices and all Southwest responses thereto.

Again, this is not tailored in any way where we can go in and effectively find what they're looking for. It's not -- it's not limited to people who had similar views to Ms. Carter or expressed something in a way that we can look for, so we run into the similarly-situated problem as it is.

I will say that we have gone to the custodians with respect to RFP 18, and we have gathered documents regarding complaints involving religious views and the social

media policy, the bullying policy, and the sexual harassment policy. And to the extent there was anything -- I don't believe there was -- we've collected and produced it. But that was one of the ones that we addressed with the custodians prior to the motion.

THE COURT: All right. And it sounds like to the extent that the other RFPs -- the universe of documents that we would be talking about would be in the seven million range, that documents responsive to this request may be even greater?

MR. CORRELL: No, Your Honor. The seven million derives from the 13 custodians identified in the briefing.

That is everything on hold for them from 2013 until today. And so all of that material has been preserved for those

13 individuals. If we expanded beyond the 13, then, yes, that number would exponentially grow.

THE COURT: Okay. As it stands now, the request to compel is denied; however, if Mr. Gilliam and Ms. Carter wish to discuss cost shifting, then I will allow the parties to continue. If you need my help -- if Ms. Carter agrees to some cost sharing with respect to that discovery production, then you can come back. But in the absence of any agreement about cost shifting to the Plaintiff for the burden for the discovery, the request is denied.

MR. GILLIAM: Understood, Your Honor.

MR. CORRELL: Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: All right. I want to make sure that we have addressed all of the matters that were brought to the Court on this motion that was referred to me because, I guess, there's some question about the discovery deadline, and I want to make sure that nothing is stuck or hung up because of something that's been referred to me. So, Mr. Gilliam, do you believe that we've addressed everything in your motion? MR. GILLIAM: Yes, Your Honor. I think we've addressed all of the -- all of the requests in the motion. THE COURT: Mr. Correll, do you agree with that? MR. CORRELL: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. Then I believe our hearing will be adjourned. I wish all of you a safe and healthy holiday season and a happy new year. MR. GILLIAM: Thank you, Your Honor. MR. CORRELL: Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thanks. (WHEREUPON, the proceedings were adjourned.)

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE I, Thu Bui, CRR, RMR, Official Court Reporter, United States District Court, Northern District of Texas, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript, to the best of my ability and understanding, from the record of the proceedings in the above-entitled and numbered matter. /s/ Thu Bui Official Court Reporter